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Abstract
In Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America Inc., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that
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the notice and takedown provision of the DMCA requires a
subjective “good faith” belief that a website is infringing
copyrighted material, and not an objective showing by the
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complaining party. A subjective standard for notice and
takedown may do less to promote collaboration between
service providers and copyright owners, judicial economy, or
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fair website management than would an objective standard
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requiring a minimal degree of investigation. This article
concludes, however, that a subjective standard is supported
by the literal wording of the statute and results in a cautious
approach to protecting copyright owners.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>

Internet technologies developed over the last several years

allow fast, easy, and inexpensive reproduction and display of
copyrighted material on a large scale. The Digital Millennium
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Copyright Act (DMCA) was passed, in part, to encourage
cooperation between copyright owners and Internet service
providers (ISP) in protecting copyrighted material. 2 Liability of
service providers is limited by the DMCA under certain
conditions. Subsection 512(c) sets forth the conditions under
which an ISP shall not be liable for copyright infringement for
information residing on its network. Under one condition, an ISP
will not risk liability if it “responds expeditiously” to remove the
suspected infringing material upon receiving notification of
such.3 Most ISPs will therefore shut down a site upon receiving
notice in order to retain safe harbor protection. Under what
standard can copyright owners or other parties send these
notifications? The recent decision of Rossi v. Motion Picture
Association of America Inc. holds that the complaining party
must have only a subjective “good faith belief” of infringement
in order to request that a website be taken down by the host
ISP.4 This article explores the workability of this standard and
its implications for both website owners and ISPs.

BACKGROUND: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND THE DMCA
<2>

The liability of ISPs for copyright infringement has evolved

over the last several years. 5 Early cases subjected ISPs to
liability for direct copyright infringement. For example, in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, an online bulletin board
system operator was held liable for direct copyright infringement
when his subscribers infringed copyrights. 6 Direct liability was
imposed again on an electronic bulletin board operator whose
subscriber uploaded copyrighted games onto the bulletin
board. 7 These cases held ISPs directly liable for infringement,
even when they were unaware of, or did not intend to engage
in, the infringing behavior.
<3>

The application of direct liability to bulletin board operators

was later rejected in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom OnLine Communication Services, Inc., one of the first cases to
consider and define the degree of knowledge necessary to
trigger liability for contributory infringement. 8 The court
rejected the Frena approach since it would result in
unreasonable liability, writing “[a]lthough copyright is a strict
liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or
causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely
used to create a copy by a third party.”9 The court instead
applied the theory of contributory infringement; since Netcom
received written notice from the copyright holder that infringing
activity was occurring on its system, Netcom was liable for
participation in the infringement. According to the Netcom court,
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“[a]lthough a mere unsupported allegation of infringement by a
copyright owner may not automatically put a defendant on
notice of infringing activity, Netcom’s position that liability must
be unequivocal is unsupportable.” 10
<4>

The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA continue this line of

reasoning. The provisions were passed in an effort to maintain
enforcement of copyright laws while encouraging cooperation
between service providers and copyright owners in monitoring
and responding to infringing activity. 11 The provisions benefit
ISPs by giving them greater certainty regarding their legal
exposure for infringing activity that may occur on their systems.
The “notice and takedown” provision allows a copyright owner
to put an ISP on notice that one or more of its subscribers may
be engaging in infringing activity. 12 It requires the copyright
owner to send to the service provider’s designated agent a
written communication which, in part, identifies the copyrighted
works at issue and states a “good faith belief” that infringement
is occurring. Once such notice is received, the ISP must “act[]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” or
risk liability for monetary, injunctive, or other equitable relief. 13

THE ROSSI DECISION
<5>

In Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America Inc., the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined the standard
that applies to a notice of claimed infringement sent under §
512(c) of the DMCA.14 The defendant, Michael Rossi, owned
and operated the online magazine “internetmovies.com” which
provided its members with a directory of websites containing
information about movies. Rossi’s website also invited its
members to download movies with notices such as “Join to
download full length movies online now!” and “NOW
DOWNLOADABLE” together with graphics of a number of
copyrighted motion pictures. As it turns out, no movies could in
fact be downloaded from Rossi’s site—it only provided links to
other sites where movies may have been available. The Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA), however, suspected
copyright infringement and sent notices to Rossi and his ISP in
compliance with § 512(c). After receiving notice from his ISP
that his site would be shut down, Rossi found a new ISP to host
his site, and initiated suit.
<6>

Rossi’s suit against the MPAA claimed “(1) tortious

interference with contractual relations; (2) tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage; (3) libel and defamation;
and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.” 15 The
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
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judgment, finding that the MPAA “had more than a sufficient
basis” to support its good faith belief that Rossi’s site contained
infringing content.16 The court rejected Rossi’s contention that a
“good faith belief” requires an objective showing of suspected
infringement, such as the results of a “reasonable
investigation.” 17 Therein lay the main controversies of this
case.
<7>

Since the DMCA does not specify the standards for a “good

faith belief,” the Ninth Circuit looked elsewhere to reach its
conclusion. The court cited several cases interpreting other
statutes requiring a good faith standard .18 As the Rossi court
explained, these cases clearly distinguish between the subjective
“good faith” standard and the objective “reasonable grounds”
standard. For example, the statute in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
required a showing of “good faith and … reasonable grounds for
believing,” which the court interpreted as requiring “both
subjective good faith and objective reasonableness.” 19 A
showing of “good faith” alone, the court reasoned, required only
a subjective belief. The opinion continued by declaring that
Congress could have introduced an objective standard in §
512(c): “The fact that it did not do so indicates an intent to
adhere to the subjective standard.” 20
<8>

The Rossi court found further support for a subjective

standard in the overall structure of § 512. 21 Because § 512(f)
imposes liability on anyone who knowingly misrepresents under
the statute, a copyright holder who makes an unknowing
mistake cannot be held liable. Imposing liability with an
objective standard would therefore be “inconsistent with
Congress’s apparent intent that the statute protect potential
violators from subjectively improper actions by copyright
owners.” 22
<9>

Counsel for Rossi argued otherwise—that “good faith … is a

belief based upon a reasonable investigation.” 23 This argument
borrowed concepts from “patent, trademark, ‘covenant of good
faith,’ and [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 11 motions.”24 In the example from
trademark law, “[g]ood faith can be found if [a defendant] …
has requested a trademark search or [has] relied on the advice
of counsel.”25 Indeed, the cited case goes further by at least
illustrating—if not precisely defining—good faith: “actual
knowledge of another's prior registration of a very similar mark
may be consistent with good faith.”26 Rossi’s counsel also found
an objective standard in the good faith requirement in Rule
11. 27 Although the term “good faith” does not appear in the
present version of Rule 11, this standard is well recognized as
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part of Rule 11(b) such that “[b]y presenting to the court … a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances[, factual and legal
contentions are warranted].” 28 Importantly, Rule 11 was
amended in 1983 to require an objective standard. 29

IS A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD WORKABLE?
<10>

Rossi’s arguments from trademark law, Rule 11, and other

areas of the law that “good faith” requires some level of actual
inquiry failed to persuade the Ninth Circuit and were curiously
absent from its opinion. While the reasons can be debated,
important practical questions remain: What are the effects of
the Rossi decision on copyright holders, alleged infringers, ISPs,
and future litigants? Is a subjective standard even desirable or
workable in the long run?

Anatomy of a Takedown: A Battle of Good Faith
<11>

To answer these questions, it is helpful to examine the

dynamics of a notice and takedown event. Assume that an ISP
hosts a subscriber’s site where potentially infringing activity is
occurring without the knowledge of the ISP. Upon suspecting
infringing activity, the copyright owner 30 will send written
notice to the ISP’s agent, in compliance with § 512(c)(3). The
ISP will not know the basis for this notice—it will simply take
the assertions made by the copyright owner at face value. But
the ISP will now be on the hook—it will have “knowledge or
awareness” of allegedly infringing activity under § 512(c) and
will not retain safe harbor protection without taking further
action. In deciding whether to take down its subscriber’s site,
the ISP will look to § 512(g), which provides that as long as the
ISP exercises “good faith” in disabling the website, it will not be
liable for silencing the alleged infringer.31 The ISP will therefore
have significant incentive to shut down the site. Upon shutdown,
a subscriber can send a counter notification to the ISP, again
under a “good faith belief,” that its site was improperly
removed. 32 Upon receiving a counter notice, the ISP can
protect itself from liability yet again by forwarding the counter
notification to the copyright owner and reinstating the site in
“not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days” unless the
copyright owner files an action in court. 33

http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a015Rozsnyai.html[3/23/2010 8:45:20 AM]

Easy Come, Easy Go: Copyright Infringement and the DMCA’s Notice and Takedown Provision in Light of Rossi v. MPAA. >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce...

The Effects of the Subjective Standard and Its Alternative
<12>

Under such a scenario it is very possible—if not probable—

that the “good faith beliefs” of a copyright owner and an alleged
infringer will conflict. Factually, of course, only one of two
situations is possible—either the subscriber is infringing, or it
isn’t. But given the difficulty of investigating a good faith belief,
it is arguable whether the various safe harbor provisions
encourage ISPs to “cooperate” with the respective parties as
Congress intended, 34 or instead act reflexively in ways that will
minimize their liability. With liability attaching only upon a
“knowing misrepresentation” under § 512(f), economics and
assumption of risk will instruct rationally behaving ISPs to shut
down a site with little to no investigation. 35 With no
requirement to investigate, certain websites like Rossi’s—where
no actual infringement is occurring—may be shut down until a
court rules otherwise. This result raises concerns of burdening
the courts with needless litigation, failing to establish clear
guidelines to resolve disputes, and violating the First
Amendment. 36
<13>

On initial consideration, an objective standard might seem

to cure these problems. Upon receiving a takedown request
under § 512(c), 37 an ISP would still act reflexively and would
shut down the allegedly infringing site. But its actions would
have some objective, factual basis. Similarly, upon receiving a
counter notice, 38 an ISP would have a more certain and clear
basis to determine whether to reinstate the website. Fewer
conflicts might therefore arise, and many of them might be
resolved before any litigation begins since only cases involving
disputed facts would escalate to the courts. Likewise, an
objective standard requiring a factual investigation might stand
as a clearer rule governing a website takedown than a more
malleable “good faith” standard. Though logical on its face, the
argument of judicial economy rings hollow empirically, since
courts have hardly seen a flood of § 512(c) cases to date.
Similarly, subjective standards such as “good faith” and
“reasonableness” remain alive and well in many other areas of
the law, and form an important cornerstone of American
jurisprudence.
<14>

Furthermore, an objective standard would risk under-

protecting the rights of copyright holders. Recalling the
purposes of the DMCA, § 512 was devised as a “warning
system” to protect against widespread and rapid copying and
distribution of protected works. 39 Conversely, if an actual
investigation is necessary before suspicious content can be
properly removed, the damage may have already occurred. By
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marrying a subjective good faith standard for takedown with a
knowing misrepresentation standard for frivolous claims,
Congress seems to have taken a cautious approach to
regulating a technology that is reinventing the very manner in
which ideas are expressed, exchanged, and protected.
Assessment of the balance between the overall benefits and
harms of this approach will be possible only after additional
disputes are resolved.

CONCLUSION
<15>

Rossi holds that the DMCA notice and takedown provision

requires a subjective good faith belief of infringement rather
than an objective belief based on investigation. Critics may
comment that a subjective standard does little to promote
coordination among copyright owners, website operators, and
ISPs; to keep petty disputes out of the courts; or to guide a
website or ISP on how it should handle copyrighted content.
Proponents, however, may favor a warning system that
safeguards against the massive damage that can result from
online copyright infringement. In a practical sense, parties
should realize the incentives that a subjective standard creates.
In most cases, ISPs will act according to the letter of § 512.
Thus, websites operating on the borderline of infringement—
whether they actually infringe or not—will likely be shut down by
their ISPs until the dispute is brought to court. The subjective
standard in the Rossi decision, however, is supported by a plain
reading of the statute. Any change to this standard will need to
be made by Congress.

PRACTICE POINTERS
Website owners should adopt a conservative
approach and avoid posting any material on their
sites that could reasonably support a “good faith
belief” of copyright infringement. Under Rossi,
claiming that movies are “NOW DOWNLOADABLE”—
even if they are not—will result in a website
takedown.
In contesting website takedowns, website owners
should likewise comply fully with the counter notice
provision of § 512(g) by providing adequate notice
to the ISP and encouraging as rapid a resolution of
the problem as possible, either by the parties or by
the court.
Copyright holders, on the other hand, should
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continue to vigorously protect their rights using the
protocols of the DMCA. Indeed, the decision in Rossi
encourages such behavior as long as it is consistent
with a subjective “good faith” belief of infringement.
As a business and customer service matter, ISPs
may wish to conduct some level of actual
investigation of allegedly infringing material on a
website, even though such inquiry is not required by
the DMCA under the Rossi decision.
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copyright owners will hesitate to make their works
readily available on the Internet without reasonable
assurance that they will be protected against
massive piracy.”). See also Zarins, supra note 5, at
260 (“By allowing for an initial ‘[section] 512
warning,’ … Congress stimulated a safer environment
for copyrights …”).
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